



Adaa' Consulting
مؤسسة أداء للاستشارات

CLOSING THE GAP

Economic Media and Yemen's Blue Economy Information Deficit

An analytical background paper examining why closing Yemen's documented data gap in the blue economy requires functioning economic media, not data collection alone.



Bridging the data-knowledge divide



The role of economic media in driving transparency and growth



Evidence, analysis, and a roadmap for action



Aden, Yemen



July 2026



ADAA FOUNDATION FOR CONSULTANCY AND STUDIES

Knowledge Product

Closing the Gap

Economic Media and Yemen's Blue Economy Information Deficit

An analytical background paper examining why closing Yemen's documented data gap in the blue economy requires functioning economic media, not data collection alone.

Aden, Yemen

July 2026

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	3
List of Abbreviations	4
1. Executive Summary	6
2. Introduction and Methodology	7
2.1 Purpose	7
2.2 Central Argument	7
2.3 Methodology.....	7
2.4 Data Limitations.....	7
3. The Information Gap, Defined	8
3.1 What the Data Gap Covers	8
3.2 Who Is Affected by the Absence of This Data.....	8
3.3 A Distinction Worth Making Precise	8
4. Why This Is a Media Problem, Not Only a Data Problem	9
4.1 Media as the Connective Tissue Between Data and Knowledge	9
4.2 Evidence That Economic Media Affects Real Economic Outcomes.....	9
4.3 An Illustrative Case: Under-Covered Institutional Reform.....	9
5. Current State of Economic and Maritime Media Coverage	10
5.1 Scale and Fragmentation of Yemen's Media Landscape	10
5.2 Economic and Port-Sector Coverage Specifically.....	10
5.3 Red Sea Littoral States	11
6. Gulf Comparative Benchmark	12
Asharq Business with Bloomberg.....	12
Al Eqtisadiah	12
Zawya and Argaam	12
The Capacity Gap, Summarized	12
Economic Sub-Indicator Comparison	12
7. Findings	14
8. Recommendations	15
8.1 Stage One — Establish the Diagnostic Baseline (0–3 months).....	15
8.2 Stage Two — Position Economic Media as the Missing Intermediary (3–9 months)	15
8.3 Stage Three — Build Measurable Capacity (9–24 months)	15
9. Data and Source Limitations	16
10. References	17

List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Full Term
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists
CSO	Civil Society Organization
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
IMS	International Media Support
MJRC	Media and Journalism Research Center
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RSF	Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans frontières)
SEMC	Studies & Economic Media Center (Yemen)
SPI	Statistical Performance Indicators (World Bank)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WDR	World Development Report (World Bank)

ADAA FOUNDATION — KNOWLEDGE PRODUCT

Closing the Gap

Economic Media & Yemen's Blue Economy
Information Deficit

THE DOCUMENTED DATA GAP

70%

data shortage in Yemen's coastal
and blue-economy sector

DeepRoot Consulting, June 2026 —
independently corroborated by OECD/EU and World Bank SPI

THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT

Data has no public value until it is found,
interpreted, and distributed — and in Yemen,
that function is performed by media that barely exists.

YEMEN'S MEDIA LANDSCAPE

235

active outlets today
(down from 365 pre-war)

0

outlets with a standing
maritime/port desk

~26%

of news websites are
independently owned

RSF ECONOMIC SUB-INDICATOR, 2026 (0-100 scale)

Enabling conditions for economic journalism — Yemen vs. regional comparators



Note: Yemen is not the region's weakest — Djibouti scores lower despite decades of political stability,
suggesting weak economic-media capacity is a regional pattern, not only a conflict effect.

THE BENCHMARK: SPECIALIZED GULF ECONOMIC MEDIA

Asharq Business

with Bloomberg

~5,000 stories/day
across Bloomberg network

Al Eqtisadiyah

Since 1992

Saudi Arabia's only daily
dedicated financial paper

Zawya

LSEG-operated

Standing Maritime
topic desk

Argaam

Saudi financial portal

Structured, queryable
sector datasets

1. Executive Summary

Yemen's blue economy suffers from a documented information deficit. DeepRoot Consulting's June 2026 coastal resilience study attributes part of the region's vulnerability to "information risks caused by data shortages reaching up to 70 percent in Yemen" — a figure this paper treats as indicative rather than precise, since DeepRoot's published methodology does not detail how the specific percentage was derived (see Section 9). The more load-bearing evidence for this paper's argument is the independent institutional corroboration that follows: the OECD, in a 2025 EU-funded assessment, found Yemen's economic data "often outdated or incomplete," with discrepancies between local and central revenue reporting and budget planning that "relies heavily on estimates due to the unavailability of updated household expenditure data." The World Bank's Statistical Performance Indicators list Yemen among a small group of countries whose statistical capacity has declined since 2016.

This paper's central argument does not depend on the precise size of the data gap, but on a distinct and independently supportable claim: even where data exists, it does not reach investors, policymakers, or the public without a functioning economic-media layer to translate and distribute it — and that layer is, at present, almost entirely absent in Yemen.

Yemen's media landscape compounds the problem. Of roughly 235 active outlets (down from 365 before the war), fewer than a third are genuinely independent, and none maintains a standing desk dedicated to maritime or port-sector reporting. Yemen's press freedom score on Reporters Without Borders' 2026 economic sub-indicator is 22.13 out of 100, ranking 172nd of 180 countries — worse than every Gulf comparator examined in this paper except Bahrain, though notably better than Djibouti (14.05), suggesting weak economic-media capacity in this corridor is a regional pattern, not solely a product of Yemen's conflict.

The paper benchmarks this gap against specialized Gulf economic media — Asharq Business with Bloomberg, Al Eqtisadiyah, Zawya, and Argaam — which demonstrate daily, sectorized, data-anchored maritime and logistics coverage that no Yemeni outlet currently produces. Drawing on World Bank, peer-reviewed, and media-development literature establishing a causal link between press freedom, economic journalism, and reduced corruption and improved investment climate, the paper concludes with a three-stage roadmap for Aadaa Foundation: establishing the diagnostic baseline, positioning economic media as the missing intermediary between data and decision-makers, and building measurable journalism capacity through partnership with Yemen's sole existing economic-media institution, the Studies & Economic Media Center (SEMC).

2. Introduction and Methodology

2.1 Purpose

This paper examines the relationship between Yemen's documented blue economy data gap and the capacity of economic media, in Yemen and the wider Red Sea and Gulf region, to convert available data into usable public and policy knowledge. It is produced as a companion knowledge product to Aadaa Foundation's separate diagnostic on Yemen's maritime trade and port performance, and is intended to inform regional policy dialogue on the role of economic media in strengthening the blue economy and sustainable maritime trade.

2.2 Central Argument

Statistical capacity-building and media capacity-building are usually treated as separate interventions. This paper argues they are interdependent: data has limited public value until it is found, interpreted, and distributed, and in most developing and fragile-state contexts that distribution function is performed by journalism. A country can therefore make real progress on data collection and still leave its underlying information deficit largely unaddressed, if the media capacity to use that data does not develop in parallel.

2.3 Methodology

This paper combines two research methods. First, a desk review of institutional sources (World Bank, OECD, UNDP, UNCTAD) corroborating the existence and severity of Yemen's economic data gap. Second, a media landscape inventory identifying which outlets in Yemen and the region currently cover economic, port, and maritime topics, characterizing their independence, specialization, and coverage depth, and benchmarking them against specialized Gulf business media. Quantitative indicators — principally the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index's economic sub-indicator — are used throughout to move the analysis beyond narrative assertion wherever comparable data exists.

2.4 Data Limitations

Methodological note: A media landscape inventory is not equivalent to a rigorous audience-reach or readership study. This paper documents the presence, ownership, and apparent specialization of media outlets; it does not measure audience size, engagement, or the actual public impact of the coverage identified. Where figures are drawn from commercial directory listings rather than research bodies, this is flagged explicitly.

3. The Information Gap, Defined

3.1 What the Data Gap Covers

DeepRoot Consulting's "Building Resilient Coastal Communities in Yemen, the GCC Countries, and Red Sea Coastal States" (25 June 2026) — a mixed-methods study applying the Gornitz Index of physical coastal vulnerability and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of economic diversification, drawing on 14 expert interviews and focus groups with 20 participants in Aden and Mocha — finds that regional coastal resilience is undermined in part by "information risks caused by data shortages reaching up to 70 percent in Yemen and 65 percent in the Horn of Africa countries." This figure is DeepRoot's own estimate; no fuller methodology detailing its derivation is publicly available beyond the published abstract, and it is treated here as supporting, illustrative evidence of a documented phenomenon rather than as a precise, independently verified statistic. DeepRoot is an established Aden-based consultancy with a research track record dating to 2015, which lends the estimate institutional credibility even where its specific methodology is not fully disclosed.

This figure, read alongside independent institutional assessments, appears to span several distinct data domains: port and vessel-traffic statistics, environmental and coastal-monitoring data, customs and trade-revenue figures, and household-level economic data. The OECD's 2025 assessment, part of the EU-funded "Promoting Economic Resilience in Yemen" project, found that while Yemen produces some consumer-price and trade statistics, "the data were often outdated or incomplete, and discrepancies were found between reported revenues at the local and central levels," and that the Ministry of Finance's budget planning "relies heavily on estimates due to the unavailability of updated household expenditure data." A July 2025 Central Bank workshop cited in the same report "highlighted the lack of regular financial flows data."

The World Bank's Statistical Performance Indicators (SPI), which score national statistical systems from 0 to 100 across data use, services, products, sources, and infrastructure, list Yemen among a small set of countries — alongside Venezuela, Burundi, the Republic of Congo, and South Sudan — whose statistical performance has declined since 2016, rather than merely stagnated.

3.2 Who Is Affected by the Absence of This Data

- Investors and financiers, who cannot price risk or identify opportunity in a sector without reliable operating data — a direct constraint on the private investment the blue economy needs to grow.
- Policymakers and donors, who cannot sequence port, fisheries, or coastal-infrastructure investment without a credible baseline of current conditions.
- Journalists themselves, who cannot report on the blue economy's performance, or hold institutions accountable for it, without access to the underlying figures.
- The general public, whose awareness of the blue economy as an economic opportunity — critical to the youth engagement goals of regional forums such as OASIS — depends on that information eventually being made public and comprehensible.

3.3 A Distinction Worth Making Precise

Data existing and data being known are not the same condition. Some of the data referenced in this section does exist, in some form, inside government ministries, port authorities, or international agency records. The 70 percent figure, and the OECD and World Bank findings that corroborate it, describe not only a collection failure but an access, currency, and usability failure. This distinction is the foundation for the paper's central argument in Section 4: closing this gap is not purely a data-engineering problem.

4. Why This Is a Media Problem, Not Only a Data Problem

4.1 Media as the Connective Tissue Between Data and Knowledge

The World Bank's 2021 World Development Report, "Data for Better Lives," frames this relationship directly: "Collecting and using data for a single purpose without making it available to others for reuse is a waste of resources," and data acquires public value only "when data are turned into valuable information" with the potential to "improve lives, transform economies, and help end poverty." The report goes further, linking this transformation explicitly to press freedom: "A free and empowered press is a critical check on government power in general and on government interference with statistical independence and data transparency in particular. Greater press freedom... is correlated with statistical independence and performance."

This is the paper's central conceptual claim: even a fully successful statistical capacity-building program in Yemen's ports and coastal sectors would leave the underlying information deficit only partially addressed, because the mechanism that ordinarily converts government and institutional data into public and investor knowledge — independent economic journalism — barely exists in the country at present.

4.2 Evidence That Economic Media Affects Real Economic Outcomes

This is not solely a theoretical claim, though the evidence available narrows in scope as it becomes more specific. A 2021 firm-level study published in the *Journal of International Management* found that "countries with greater press freedom have significantly fewer incidences of bribery involving public officials," with a free press associated with "a substantial reduction in the percentage of firms that report corruption during interactions with tax officials and when obtaining construction permits." This builds on the foundational Brunetti and Weder study (*Journal of Public Economics*, 2003), which found a significant relationship between greater press freedom and less corruption, with the causal direction running from press freedom to lower corruption rather than the reverse. These studies establish a causal link between general press freedom and reduced corruption; this paper uses them as the best available evidentiary anchor for a more specific claim — that economic and business journalism affects investment climate outcomes in a particular sector, the blue economy — that no study located in this research addresses directly. The chain from general press freedom, to economic journalism specifically, to blue-economy investment climate in particular, involves two scope-narrowings the underlying evidence does not itself test, and the argument in this section should be read accordingly as a reasoned extension of adjacent evidence, not a directly proven claim.

BBC Media Action's governance research, surveying 23,000 people across seven developing countries, found that audiences of its media development programming "know more about politics, discuss politics more and participate more in politics" than non-audiences, controlling for age, income, and prior interest — evidence that functioning media measurably increases public engagement with economic and civic affairs, not merely awareness of it.

4.3 An Illustrative Case: Under-Covered Institutional Reform


Adaa Foundation's companion diagnostic on Yemen's maritime trade documents a clear example of the kind of story this information gap leaves under-reported: the internationally recognized government's 2021 customs tariff reform, which raised short-term revenue but accelerated a longer-term shift of import traffic toward Houthi-controlled ports as government ports became less price-competitive. This is precisely the kind of institutional policy consequence that a functioning economic-media sector, in a data-rich environment, would ordinarily surface, analyze, and hold accountable — and precisely the kind that goes unreported in Yemen's current media landscape, for reasons documented in Section 5.

5. Current State of Economic and Maritime Media Coverage

5.1 Scale and Fragmentation of Yemen's Media Landscape

Yemen's media sector has contracted and fragmented sharply since 2015. A Yemeni Journalists' Syndicate and International Federation of Journalists survey, cited by the Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC) in August 2024, counted 365 outlets operating before the war; approximately 235 remain active today, comprising 32 satellite channels, 37 radio stations, 17 print newspapers and magazines, and 149 digital news websites. The war suspended 165 outlets while 137 new ones launched — a churn that has left the sector both smaller and less institutionally stable than before 2015.

Independence is scarce across every format. Of 60 radio stations, only 18 are independent; of 132 newspapers and magazines, only 32; of 118 news websites, only 31; of 26 satellite channels, only 3. Ownership tracks the conflict's political fault lines directly: Houthi-aligned outlets receive Iranian and Hezbollah funding; government-aligned outlets receive Saudi funding; Islah-aligned outlets (including Yemen Shabab TV and Belqees TV) receive partial Qatari funding; and General People's Congress, National Resistance, and Southern Transitional Council-aligned outlets receive UAE funding, per MJRC's 2024 analysis. Reporters Without Borders confirms that Yemeni media "have no choice but to align themselves with those in power in their area," and documents businessmen and politicians using the weak economic environment to "bribe journalists and media outlets."



Source: Yemeni Journalists' Syndicate / International Federation of Journalists survey, via Media and Journalism Research Center, "Funding Journalism in Yemen" (August 2024). None of the independent outlets in any format maintains a standing desk dedicated to maritime or blue-economy reporting (see Section 5.2).

Figure 2 breaks this down by format. Independence is not evenly distributed: news websites and print outlets each retain roughly a quarter to a third independent ownership, while satellite television — the format with the widest reach — is almost entirely captured, with only 3 of 26 channels independently owned. This matters directly for this paper's argument: television is typically where specialized economic programming (modeled on Asharq Business's format, discussed in Section 6) would have the greatest public reach, and it is also the format where independent ownership is scarcest.

5.2 Economic and Port-Sector Coverage Specifically

General-interest outlets provide the closest approximation to economic coverage available in Yemen today. Aden al-Ghad, a southern Yemen outlet based in Aden, is noted for reporting on maritime commerce given the

city's strategic port position, and several general outlets (Yemenat, Yemen-Saeed, Yemen Press, Al-Thawra) maintain nominal "economy" sections. None of these outlets maintains a specialized, standing desk dedicated to port, shipping, or blue-economy reporting comparable to the sectorized coverage found in Gulf specialized business media, examined in Section 6.

Yemen's sole dedicated economic-media institution is the Studies & Economic Media Center (SEMC), described by its own materials as "the first civil society organization in Yemen specialized in studies and media matters that are related to economic matters." SEMC pursues professional economic journalism, runs the Yemeni Economic Forum, has trained 150 journalists over two years, and led advocacy for a Yemeni access-to-information law. It is structured as a civil-society organization and think tank, however, not as a daily newsroom — meaning Yemen currently has an institutional advocate for economic journalism, but not yet a functioning economic-news production capacity operating at newsroom scale.

Notably, the operational information that does flow about Yemen's ports currently originates largely outside Yemeni journalism altogether: port authorities' own channels, UN agency reporting (including UNDP's coverage of Aden port rehabilitation), and maritime-industry and insurance sources such as NorthStandard and GAC Yemen. This is itself evidence for this paper's central argument — where port-sector information does reach the public, it typically bypasses domestic economic media entirely, arriving instead through institutional or commercial channels not oriented toward public accountability or investment-climate signaling.

5.3 Red Sea Littoral States

Coverage capacity is similarly constrained across neighboring Red Sea states, for related but distinct reasons. Djibouti's media are, per Reporters Without Borders, "under permanent lockdown," limited almost entirely to state-owned outlets, with no independently based media outlet operating in the country at all — despite port and logistics activity accounting for an estimated 70 percent of Djibouti's GDP (Coface Djibouti Country Risk File, 2025), one of the most concentrated single-sector economies in the region and, on this evidence, one of the least publicly reported on by independent media. Somalia's press faces acute physical danger rather than only structural weakness: the Somali Journalists Syndicate documented at least 18 violations against journalists since January 2026, including the killing of reporter Abshir Khalif Shidane in March 2026. Sudan's media sector has effectively collapsed amid conflict (161st of 180 on the 2026 RSF Index), and Eritrea permits no privately owned media at all, ranking last globally.

6. Gulf Comparative Benchmark

Specialized Gulf business and economic media illustrate the data-driven, sectorized journalism capacity that is almost entirely absent from Yemen's media landscape, and that this paper argues Yemen's blue economy needs in order to convert available data into usable public and investment-climate knowledge.

Asharq Business with Bloomberg

Launched in November 2020 as a joint venture of the Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG) and Bloomberg, Asharq Business operates a 24-hour Arabic business television network alongside digital and radio platforms, drawing on Bloomberg's global newsgathering infrastructure — described by Bloomberg Media as more than 2,700 journalists and analysts across over 120 bureaus in more than 70 countries, producing roughly 5,000 stories daily. In 2024 it expanded weekday programming with sectorized shows covering markets, energy, and technology, with its Director of Business News emphasizing "data-driven insights" as an explicit editorial priority. Argaam reports the network holds over 50 percent of the regional footprint for Arabic-language digital and social economic news.

Al Eqtisadiah

Operating since 1992 and often described as "the Financial Times of Saudi Arabia," Al Eqtisadiah is the Kingdom's sole daily newspaper dedicated exclusively to economic and financial analysis, covering stock markets, energy, real estate, currencies, and tourism economics. A 2024 strategic partnership with Asharq Business created what both organizations describe as one of the region's largest specialized economic-media platforms.

Zawya and Argaam

Zawya, operated by the London Stock Exchange Group, maintains a standing "Maritime" topic feed with regular transport and logistics coverage spanning port operators (AD Ports Group, DP World), free-zone authorities, and regional maritime-logistics conferences. Argaam, a Saudi financial data portal, publishes structured datasets on banking, cement, petrochemicals, and trade — the kind of standing, queryable economic dataset that no Yemeni outlet currently produces or maintains.

The Capacity Gap, Summarized

These four outlets share characteristics almost entirely absent from Yemen's media landscape: daily (not episodic) publication cadence; sector-specific desks and reporters; direct integration with market-data infrastructure; and an explicit institutional identity built around economic, rather than general political, coverage. Yemen's closest equivalent, SEMC, is a capacity-building and advocacy organization rather than a comparable newsroom, and no Yemeni outlet maintains anything resembling a standing maritime or port desk.


Economic Sub-Indicator Comparison

Reporters Without Borders' 2026 World Press Freedom Index scores each country on five sub-indicators; the economic indicator specifically evaluates constraints linked to government policy, non-state commercial actors, and media ownership structures — a proxy, though an imperfect one, for the institutional and financial conditions needed to sustain specialized economic journalism.

Country	Economic Score (/100)	Economic Rank (/180)	Overall Global Rank
Qatar	52.60	48th	75th
Kuwait	36.47	116th	136th

Country	Economic Score (/100)	Economic Rank (/180)	Overall Global Rank
UAE	35.45	123rd	158th
Oman	35.33	124th	127th
Saudi Arabia	33.00	141st	176th
Bahrain	22.52	171st	170th
Yemen	22.13	172nd	164th
Djibouti	14.05	179th	167th

Figure 1 renders this comparison visually. Yemen sits second-to-last regionally, but the chart makes the paper's key nuance immediately legible: Djibouti's bar is shorter still, despite decades free of the conflict that plausibly explains much of Yemen's score. The four GCC comparators with genuine specialized economic-media infrastructure (Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Oman) cluster well above both Yemen and Djibouti, while Saudi Arabia and Bahrain occupy a middle band — illustrating that economic-media capacity and general press freedom, while related, are not identical measures.



Source: Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2026, economic sub-indicator (rsf.org/en/index/score-eco). Yemen highlighted in rust; Djibouti and Bahrain in gray reflect their non-conflict-driven low scores, discussed in Section 6.

Two nuances are worth making explicit, the first more tentatively than the second. Yemen is not the region's weakest economic-media environment: Djibouti scores lower still, despite decades of relative political stability. This is consistent with a hypothesis that state-media dominance, not conflict alone, contributes to weak economic-journalism capacity regionally — but it rests on a single composite index score from one methodology, whose internal construction (the relative weight given to ownership concentration, advertising markets, or regulatory environment) is not unpacked in RSF's public methodology. The Djibouti comparison is offered here as a plausible, worthwhile hypothesis for further investigation, not as an established causal finding. Second, Saudi Arabia's overall global press-freedom rank (176th) is driven primarily by its political, legal, and security sub-scores; its economic sub-score (33.00) is higher than Yemen's, Bahrain's, and Djibouti's. This paper benchmarks Yemen specifically against Gulf economic-journalism infrastructure and capacity — the presence of specialized, data-driven, sectorized business newsrooms — not against overall press freedom, and the two should not be conflated when reading this comparison.

7. Findings

- **Yemen's blue-economy information deficit is real and severe: the OECD and World Bank independently document declining statistical capacity and data quality, and DeepRoot's estimate, while not independently verifiable in its precise figure, is directionally consistent with this institutional evidence.**
- The deficit spans both data availability (a collection and infrastructure problem) and data usability (a media and translation problem); this paper's contribution is demonstrating that the second problem is at least as severe as the first, and is currently receiving far less institutional attention.
- Yemen's media landscape lacks any newsroom-scale, standing economic or maritime desk; SEMC is a genuine institutional foundation to build on, but is structured as a civil-society advocacy and training body, not a production newsroom.
- Port-sector information in Yemen currently flows primarily through institutional and commercial channels (port authorities, UN agencies, maritime insurers) rather than through domestic journalism — meaning the public-accountability function of a free press is largely absent from this sector specifically, even where information does exist and circulate.
- Weak economic-media capacity is a regional pattern along the Red Sea corridor, not unique to Yemen's conflict — Djibouti's economic sub-score is lower than Yemen's despite decades of political stability, implicating state-media dominance as an independent contributing factor.
- Specialized Gulf business media (Asharq Business, Al Eqtisadiah, Zawya, Argaam) demonstrate a concrete, currently operating model — daily, sectorized, data-anchored coverage — that could inform capacity-building design, rather than requiring Yemen to build an entirely novel institutional model from scratch.

8. Recommendations

8.1 Stage One — Establish the Diagnostic Baseline (0–3 months)

- Frame future Adaa Foundation and regional-forum work around three corroborated pillars: DeepRoot's 70 percent data-shortage finding, OECD/World Bank evidence of declining Yemeni statistical capacity, and RSF/CPJ/MJRC evidence of Yemen's weak media capacity — presenting all three together rather than any single source in isolation.
- Commission a sectoral breakdown identifying specifically which blue-economy data domains are missing (port throughput, fisheries catch data, customs revenue, vessel-call records, environmental monitoring), sharpening the general 70 percent finding into an actionable map.

8.2 Stage Two — Position Economic Media as the Missing Intermediary (3–9 months)

- Deploy the World Bank's "data has no value until used" framing, together with the press-freedom/corruption evidence in Section 4, to argue explicitly to donors and regional forums that statistical capacity-building programs will under-deliver without parallel investment in economic-journalism capacity.
- **Design and propose a concrete pilot: a partnership between Adaa Foundation, SEMC, and one or two Aden-based outlets (e.g., Aden al-Ghad) to establish Yemen's first standing data-driven maritime and port-economy reporting desk, explicitly modeled on the sectorized format demonstrated by Zawya's Maritime feed and Argaam's structured datasets. This partnership framing is a recommendation for outreach, not a confirmed arrangement; neither SEMC nor Aden al-Ghad has yet been approached regarding this proposal, and the pilot should be presented externally as subject to partner confirmation until such outreach occurs.**

8.3 Stage Three — Build Measurable Capacity (9–24 months)

- Track concrete output indicators: number of data-driven economic or maritime stories published per quarter; number of journalists trained in economic and data journalism; and whether any Yemeni outlet successfully establishes a standing maritime or port desk.
- Given the collapse of major international media-development funding in 2025 (see Section 9), prioritize low-cost, partnership-based interventions — embedding data-journalism training within SEMC's existing programs, or partnering with established regional media-development organizations (IMS, CFI) — over standing up new, freestanding institutions.
- Build in an explicit contingency: if press-freedom conditions in Yemen deteriorate further, or funding for in-country capacity-building remains unavailable, pivot toward diaspora or exile economic-media models and cross-border data platforms, which are structurally more resilient to domestic repression and funding volatility than in-country newsroom investment.

9. Data and Source Limitations

- The 70 percent data-shortage figure originates from DeepRoot Consulting's own estimate and is treated throughout this paper as illustrative supporting evidence rather than a headline statistic, given that no fuller methodology is publicly available; independent sources corroborate the underlying phenomenon (severe, worsening data gaps) but not the precise percentage itself, and the full methodology behind that specific figure is not detailed in DeepRoot's published abstract.
- Outlet counts for Yemen's media landscape (approximately 235 active of 365 pre-war) derive from Yemeni Journalists' Syndicate and International Federation of Journalists surveys of varying dates, and should be treated as best-available estimates rather than audited figures.
- Some outlet-level descriptions (e.g., Aden al-Ghad's maritime-coverage focus) are drawn from commercial media directory listings rather than academic or press-freedom research bodies, and are indicative rather than authoritative.
- Reporters Without Borders' economic sub-indicator is a proxy for economic-journalism enabling conditions, not a direct measure of maritime or blue-economy coverage specifically; no index measuring sector-specific economic journalism capacity was identified during this research.
- No academic study making the specific causal claim that economic journalism improves blue-economy investment climate outcomes was located; the causal argument in Section 4 rests instead on adjacent, well-evidenced literature — press freedom's relationship to corruption and civic engagement generally — rather than a blue-economy-specific study, and this substitution is flagged rather than presented as a precise match.
- International media-development funding for fragile and conflict-affected states declined sharply following 2025 U.S. government funding cuts; the Internews Europe/BBC Media Action/Free Press Unlimited "Crisis in Journalism" report (June 2025) estimates approximately US\$150 million in direct journalism funding will likely disappear as a result, a constraint directly relevant to the feasibility of this paper's recommendations and reflected in the funding-related contingency in Section 8.3.

10. References

1. DeepRoot Consulting. "Building Resilient Coastal Communities in Yemen, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries, and Red Sea Coastal States." 25 June 2026.
<https://www.deeproot.consulting/en/publications/building-resilient-coastal-communities-in-yemen-the-gulf-cooperation-council-gcc-countries-and-red-sea-coastal-states>
2. OECD. "Capacity for Economic Data Collection and Analysis," in Promoting Economic Resilience in Yemen. 2025.
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/promoting-economic-resilience-in-yemen_81ed2898-en/full-report/capacity-for-economic-data-collection-and-analysis_a909c60d.html
3. World Bank. "New Statistical Performance Indicators (SPI) Data Release." November 2025.
<https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/new-statistical-performance-indicators--spi--data-release--how-a>
4. World Bank. World Development Indicators, Statistical Performance Indicators — Yemen.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.SPI.OVRL?locations=YE>
5. UNDP / OPHI. "Measuring Multidimensional Poverty in Yemen." February 2024.
https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-02/multidimensional_poverty_in_yemen_en.pdf
6. World Bank. World Development Report 2021: Data for Better Lives.
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2021> ; <https://wdr2021.worldbank.org/stories/governing-data/> ; <https://wdr2021.worldbank.org/stories/data-as-a-force-for-public-good/>
7. Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC). "Funding Journalism in Yemen." August 2024.
<https://journalismresearch.org/2024/08/funding-journalism-in-yemen/> ;
<https://journalismresearch.org/2024/08/yemen/>
8. Reporters Without Borders (RSF). "Yemen." Country profile. <https://rsf.org/en/country/yemen>
9. Reporters Without Borders (RSF). "2026 RSF Index: Press Freedom at a 25-Year Low." 30 April 2026.
<https://rsf.org/en/2026-rsf-index-press-freedom-25-year-low>
10. Reporters Without Borders (RSF). World Press Freedom Index 2026 — Economic Indicator, full country data.
<https://rsf.org/en/index/score-eco>
11. Reporters Without Borders (RSF). "RSF World Press Freedom Index 2025: Economic Fragility a Leading Threat to Press Freedom." <https://rsf.org/en/rsf-world-press-freedom-index-2025-economic-fragility-leading-threat-press-freedom>
12. Studies & Economic Media Center (SEMC). <https://economicmedia.net/en/> ; DARPE profile: <https://darpe.me/implement-entries/studies-and-economic-media-center-semc/> ; Peace Insight profile: <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/organisations/studies-economic-media-center-semc/>
13. allnewspaperlist.com. "Yemen All Newspaper List." April 2026.
<https://www.allnewspaperlist.com/2026/04/yemen-all-newspaper-list.html>
14. Feedspot. "Yemen News Websites." 2025. https://news.feedspot.com/yemen_news_websites/
15. UNDP Yemen. "New Waves of Hope: Rehabilitating the Port of Aden to Enhance Economic Growth in Yemen." <https://www.undp.org/yemen/stories/new-waves-hope-rehabilitating-port-aden-enhance-economic-growth-yemen>
16. NorthStandard. "Yemen Port Situation Update." <https://north-standard.com/insights-and-resources/resources/news/yemen-port-situation-update>

17. RSF. "Djibouti." Country profile. <https://rsf.org/en/country/djibouti> ; Africa Center for Strategic Studies. "Djibouti: An Uncontested Election Masks a Sea of Instability." <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/en-elections-2026/djibouti/>
18. Horn Observer. Somali Journalists Syndicate violations reporting. <https://hornobserver.com/articles/3646/>
19. Daily News Egypt. "Asharq Business with Bloomberg Expands Programming Amid Growing Demand for Economic News." 18 September 2024. <https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2024/09/18/asharq-business-with-bloomberg-expands-programming-amid-growing-demand-for-economic-news/>
20. Argaam. "Asharq Celebrates Five Years of Growth, Cementing Its Position as the Region's Leading Arabic-Language Source for Business News." <https://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/1858092>
21. Bloomberg Media. SRMG/Asharq News press materials. <https://www.bloombergmedia.com/press/srmg-asharq-news/>
22. Wikipedia. "Al Eqtisadiah." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Eqtisadiah ; Lingua Sinica. "Al Eqtisadiah." <https://lingua-sinica.org/dispatch/al-eqtisadiah/>
23. Zawya (LSEG). Maritime topic feed. <https://www.zawya.com/primarykeyword/MARITIME>
24. Journal of International Management. Press freedom and firm-level corruption study. 2021. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0939362521000704>
25. Brunetti, A. & Weder, B. "A Free Press Is Bad News for Corruption." Journal of Public Economics, 2003. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272701001864>
26. Open Government Partnership / BBC Media Action. "Media Can Help Improve Accountability." <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/media-can-help-improve-accountability/>
27. Internews. Governance and data-journalism programming. <https://internews.org/governance> ; "New Report Reveals Global Fallout from U.S. Government Funding Cuts." <https://internews.org/new-report-reveals-global-fallout-from-u-s-government-funding-cuts/>
28. International Media Support (IMS). "A Gender Analysis of the Media Landscape in Yemen." May 2024. https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/IMS_Yemen-2024-FINAL.pdf
29. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). "Israel's Killing of 31 Yemeni Journalists Marks Deadliest Global Attack in 16 Years." 19 September 2025. <https://cpj.org/2025/09/israels-killing-of-31-yemeni-journalists-marks-deadliest-global-attack-in-16-years/>